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We are in the midst of a tidal wav’e
of mergers. The distinctive feature of
the present merger wave is the large
number involving huge corporations.
Observers of the food manufacturing and
food distribution industries have not
previously seen mergers on the scale of
Nabisco-Standard Brands, Beatrice’s acqui-
sition of Esmark which had not yet diges-
ted Norton Simon, Nestle’s acquisition of
Carnation, R. J. Reynold’s acquisition of
Heublein, Grand Union’s acquisition of
Colonial Stores, Kroger’s acquisition of
Dillon, and most recently, American
Store’s acquisition of Jewel Cos., the
biggest in the history of food retailing.
And this is far from a complete list.
I have been asked to talk about the
effects of retail mergers. As some of
you may know, I was a pro bono economist
for the government in challenging Nation-
al Tea’s acquisition of Applebaums and
Grand Union’s acquisition of Colonial.
Both mergers occurred in late 1978 or
early 1979. The National Tea-Applebaums
merger was horizontal; Grand Union-Colon-
ial was a market extension merger.
National Tea, the number five chain
in Minneapolis , acquired Applebaums, the
number three chain-- resulting in a
merged market share about equal to the
leading chain. I opposed the merger
because Applebaums was one of the strong-
est competitors in the market and Nation-
al Tea had a proven ability to turn
“silk purses into sow’s ears.” I was
afraid National would do the same with
Applebaums, a rather unusual basis for
opposing a merger. The merger was al-
lowed and National Tea began to work
its magic. By 1983--four short. years
later-- the Applebaum and National Tea
stores were sold to Gateway Foods (the
Applebaum family was also involved).
The market share of the merged company
had plunged to about.one-third the level
at.the time of the merger. Even econom-
ists are right once in a while.
Little did I know that. a similar
scenario would be played out in the
Grand Union case. There were 13 SMSAS
involved in that case--one of which
Colonial had exited by the time of the
case. Of the remaining 12, Grand Union
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ing two where they were the leading firm
(Norfolk and Newport News) and another
where they were second . In the five
SMSAS in which Grand Union still oper-
ates, their market share has dropped by
more than half in two and by nearly 25
percent in Atlanta, the most important
market in the acquisition. Only in Fay-
etteville and Raleigh-Durham has Grand
Union been able to hang onto the market
share it bought. From the tradespeople
I talk with, it. t30und8 like Grand Union
raided the assets of Colonial, It may
have been a profitable investment for Sir
James Goldsmith and Cavenham--I don’t
know--but it has been devastating for
Colonial as a chain.
What has been the effect on competi-
tion? It really depends on who took over
the Grand Union stores and market share,
which I have not attempted to track. If
they went to fringe companies so as to
weaken the oligopolistic core in these
markets, competition may have been
strengthened. If the stores and sales
went to the market leaders, competition
may have been weakened. It is clear that
a viable competitor has been lost in at
least six SMSAS.
It is difficult to evaluate the ef-
fects of retail mergers, in part because
this depends upon the number and type of
mergers that are allowed by the antitrust
laws and the agencies responsible for
enforcing those laws. Since the Clayton
Act was amended by the Cellar-Kefauver
Act in 1950, there has been market varia-
tions in the int.erpretat.ion and enforce-
ment of this law. Acquisitions of food
retailing stores and companies from 1949
to 1983 are shown in Figure 1 and Appen-
dix Table A. The retail sales (in 1967
dollars) acquired through mergers peaked
in 1967-68 and has had a series of peaks
from 1978 to the present.
The retail sales acquired by the top
10 and top 20 grocery chains are also
plotted on Figure 1. Whereas these
chains accounted for a high percentage
of the sales acquired from 1949-1964, the
following ten-year period was one of
tough enforcement of the merger laws by
the antitrust agencies. Overall merger
activity increased during this period;
however, the mergers were channeled to
smaller companies. From 1975 through
1978, the top 20 chains were once again
the major acquirers. Possibly because
the Grand Union-Colonial merger was
challenged and initially found illegal,
large chains cooled their merger appe-
tites somewhat in the next four years,
and especially during 1981 and 1982. In
1983, the large chains jumped back into
the merger arena with enthusiasm. And,
large chain mergers in 1984 may even
surpass those in 1983.
Antitrust enforcement. today is very
selective; there is little interest in
challenging mergers. Thus, evidence con-
cerning the effects of mergers during an
earlier period may provide no basis for
judging the effects of the present wave
of mergers. Because of this, I want to
spend some time discussing the changes
in antitrust enforcement and the key
factors that may influence future merger
enforcement act.ivit.ies.
Since the mid 1970s, the antitrust
agencies have increasingly turned their
backs on mergers, large and small. In
the last two or three years, even sub-
stantial horizontal mergers have been
ignored. In my home town of Madison,
Wisconsin, the number one chain, Eagle,
was recently acquired by the number two
chain, Kohls (which was acquired by A&P
in 1983). The estimated market shares
of these chains in 1983 were 21.5 and
17.4 percent (Metro Market Studies,
1984). Although their combined market
share is probably something less than 39
percent because of the sales gains of
warehouse stores and one or two store
closings, the merged chain clearly domin-
ates the market. Sentry is the only
other market-wide operator of convention-
al supermarkets and superstores is a
voluntary group.
In California, Lucky recently ac-
quired Smith Food King with no response





from antitrust agencies. The two were was number one (17.8%) and Smith Food
competitors in four SMSAS; of particular King number two (15.0%) in 1983 accord-
concern is Santa Barbara where Lucky ing to Metro Market Studies.
Figure 1. Acquisitions of Food Retailers, 1949-83
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number one chain with 22 percent of the
market was allowed to acquire ten A&P
stores in 1979. A&P ranked fifth in the
market according to Metro with a 7 per-
cent share. The list goes on. Clearly,
the precedent established by the Von’s
case has been abandoned. Since the Feder-
al Trade Commission has been primarily
responsible for antitrust enforcement in
the food distribution industries, it is
primarily this agency that must be credi-
ted with opening the merger flood gates.
Although the Commission largely endorsed
the Merger Guidelines issued by the Jus-
tice Department in 1982, it has subse-
quently ignored horizontal mergers that
seriously violated the Guidelines.
What do we make of this? Is the
recent lapse in enforcement simply a
reflection of the political philosophy of
this administrat.ion or are there legal or
economic explanations? Although one can
chalk up the FTC’s paralysis to politics,
of equal importance is the economic Welt-
anschaung held by Chairman Miller and his
economist colleague, Commissioner Doug-
las. This is the first time an economist
has served on the Commission; now we have
two in extremely powerful positions. As
a result, economic doctrine probably has
more influence over the present Commis-
sion than anytime in history. Armed with
the new theories and empirical evidence
of “revisionist” industrial organization
economists, the Commission has charted a
new course for ant.it.rust enforcement.
Let me depart for a moment to com-
ment. on the debate between traditionali-
sts and revisionists within the field
of industrial organization. During the
last decade or so, a reinterpretat.ion of
the concentration-profitability litera-
ture has been gaining adherents. The
traditional monopoly power explanation
for the positive concentration-profits
relationship found in many empirical
studies was challenged by Brozen, Dem-
setz, Peltzman and others, who argued
that efficiency and lower costs in con-
centrated industries accounted for the
relationship --not higher prices (Paut-
ler). This argument was reinforced by
William Baumol’s new theory of contest-
able markets, which emphasizes that
concentration has no effect if there is
completely free entry and exit into an
industry. In spite of its extreme and
simplistic assumptions (see Shepherd’s
critique), contestable market theory
has attracted followers in part because
of its mathematical elegance.
This debate will not soon end. The
stakes are too high. Perhaps the most
telling evidence comes from studies of
concentration-price relationships. If
the revisionists are right, prices in
concentrated markets should not be high-
er and might be lower than prices in
unconcentrated markets. Either a nega-
tive or no relationship between concen-
tration and prices would be expected.
Roughly twenty studies have exam-
ined concentration-price relationships
across local markets for gasoline,
drugs, groceries, bread, beer, business
loans, life insurance, auto loans and
other product-services. After reviewing
these studies, Greer (1984) concludes,
II .*. prices and concentration are
positively related” (p. 296). F.~
Scherer agrees. In the 1980 edition
of his highly respected book, Scherer
comments on the various studies relating
prices to concentration:
Although one can, as always,
quarrel with the particular
samples, controls, and methods
employed in these studies,
their overall thrust is unam-
biguous. Prices do tend to be
higher when markets are highly
concentrated than when they
are not.
Thus , to date, the evidence supports
the traditional point of view that con-
centration conveys market power and
results in supra-competitive prices.
Perhaps because of the debate con-
cerning the effects of market concen-
tration, the FTC currently places heavy
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ciencies th’at may be gained in concen-
trated markets. One also senses that
the Commission has a strong faith that
businessmen and consumers are rational,
and that competition is generally effec-
tive-- particularly when left alone.
There is a pervasive laissez faire men-
tality.
This is reflected in the Grand Union
decision. The Commission’s decision in
that case rested on the following logic.
- The relevant product market involved
in the merger was all grocery
storea, including supermarkets,
warehouse stores, box stores and
convenience stores.
- During the 1970s, there was some
type of grocery store entry into
nearly all of the 13 SMSAS involved
in the case.
- Several firms already in these mar-
kets expanded in number of stores
or market share during the 1970s.
- Therefore, entry barriers into gro-
cery retailing must be low. The
Administrative Law Judge’s decision
finding the acquisition illegal
was reversed.
One of the key statements in Chair-
man Millers’ decision is:
Indeed, this consistent pattern
of recent entry and expansion
in these numerous markets may
indicate that barriers to enter-
ing the retail grocery industry
*PE:S ‘X::;:lY s
1983, p. 49)
Although this conclusion was based upon
startlingly skimpy evidence, it accurate-
ly foretold subsequent FTC actions. If
an industry has low entry barriers, anti-
trust has little role. Predation is
irrational and unlikely if there are no
entry barriers. Mergers are of no con-
cern, for it firms try to elevate
prices, new firms will enter. If firms
try to collude, new firms will seize
that opportunity to enter the market.
Thus, the extent to which entry barriers
exist in food retailing is the key issue
with the present Commission-
1s the Commission correct? Are
entry barriers low? If so, mergers can
be expected to have little if any effect
on competition. What are the important
factors to consider? Since entry barri-
ers can only be ascertained once the
relevant product and geographic markets
have been properly defined, I will exam-
ine this subject next, followed by a
discussion of entry conditions.
Strategic Groups and
Submarkets in Food Retailing
Those that labor on the marketing
faculties of our schools of business
have long recognized that businesses
“segment” their markets and attempt to
“position” their product-service-price
offers so as to appeal to certain market.
segments. In recent years, academicians
interested in business strategic plan-
ning or in industrial organizat.ion have
attempted to develop a more comprehen-
sive theoretical framework. Michael
Porter has written extensively on the
theory of strategic groups and mobility
barriers. Porter’s basic notion is
relatively simple. In any given indus-
try, there is a continuum of firms with
different strategies regarding products,
prices and services. Some may appeal
to customers desiring low prices; others
may appeal to customers seeking high
quality or services. In addition, firms
are often clustered in groups along the
continuum of strategies, hence the term
strategic groups. Firms compete most
directly with other firms in their “stra-
tegic group,” and less directly with
firms in other strategic groups. Stra-
tegic groups that are sufficiently “dis-
tant” from one another are only indirect
competitors; for antitrust. purposes,
they are in separate product markets.
Porter and his colleagues also propose
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the extent to which barriers prevent the
movement of firms from one strategic
group to another. He argues that all
firms strive to drive other firms out of
their strategic territory and to create
sustainable mobility barriers. Where
there exist strategic groups with high
mobility barriers, indust-ry st.ruct.ure
may be misleading. As Porter states:
“An industry need not be concentrated
for a particular strategic group to have
enormous market power” (1981, p. 455-56).
Strategic Groups
In Food Retailins!
For illustrative purposes, I have
identified eight retail store formats in
Figure 2, classified by price and service
levels and by breadth of product assort-
ment. While stores might be classified
by other attributes, these three are
probably the most important in trying to
visualize the “space” between different
store formats. In general, low price
stores have low service and vice versa,
but this is not always the case. Includ-
ed in “service” is the pleasantness of
the shopping environment as well as cus-
tomer services such as carry-out, check
cashing, special departments, etc.
Each store format can be viewed as
a strategic group. For each to survive
in a market, there must be a segment
of customers who prefer that cluster of
products, services and prices. For exam-
ple, box stores have met with limited
success in most markets and may not sur-
vive as a strategic group.
All these strategic groups compete
to some degree with each other if they
are located in the same geographic mar-
ket. 1 can buy ground coffee at a conven-
tional supermarket, a warehouse store, a
convenience store, or at a specialized
coffee-tea shop. However, does that.mean
they are in the same product market for
economic analysis or for antitrust
purposes?
The Department of Justice has pro-
posed procedures for identifying rele-
vant product markets in its 1982 Merger
Guidelines.1 The latter states:
..* the Department seeks to
identify a group of products
such that a hypothetical firm
that was the only present and
future seller of those prod-
ucts could raise price profit-
ably. (Us. Dept. of Jus-
.
tlce$ p. 5)
Thus, the Department.ts approach attempts
to include all close substitutes within
its market boundaries, but to exclude
all poor substitutes.
In the case of food retailing, the
“product” is the product-service-price
bundle provided by various retail
stores. Thus , the question becomes
whether consumers perceive the “bundles”
of various types of stores as close
substitutes. For consumers, are conven-
ience stores or meat markets close sub-
stitutes for supermarkets? Are ware-
house stores close subst.itut.es for super-
st.ores?
1 believe most people would agree
that specialty meat., bakery or confec-
tionery stores are in separate markets
from the remaining store formats in
Figure 2. I suspect that there would
also be general agreement that combina-
tion stores and super stores belong in
the same product market. At least for
now, I will argue that all five store
formats on or above the horizontal line
in Figure 2 compete directly enough t.o
be placed in the same product market.
All provide the breadth of assortment
and price levels to compete for the
major shopping trips of consumers.
All would be classified by the trade
under the general umbrella of “supermar-
kets.”
In my judgment., however, conveni-
ence stores (and other small grocery
stores) are in a distinct product submar-
ket and do not compete directly with the
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February 85/page 85five formats classified as supermarkets.
The Administrative Law Judge in the Grand
Union case (Federal Trade Commission,
1981c) concluded:
The record in this case is
replete with evidence that
supermarkets, by and large,
compete with other supermarkets
.**. (p. 204)
Convenience stores are not
generally price-checked by
supermarket firm operators.
They carry little, if any,
produce and meat, and indeed,
average only 500-3000 items.
Supermarkets stock from
8-12,000 items. Convenience
stores generally have only one
employee per shift and they
average sales of from $1-3 per
customer, as compared to the
$11-15 average sale for super-
markets. Convenience stores
are generally not considered in
supermarket expansions and
store location studies. Basi-
cally, the only competition
they offer to supermarkets is
in terms of hours of operation.
(p. 204)
The record evidence shows that.
the gross margins of supermar-
kets are 15-20% as opposed t.o
30% for non-supermarket grocery
firms such as convenience
stores. (p. 200)
Grand Union’s and Colonial’s
supermarkets averaged over $3
million dollars in annual sales
per store, while convenience
stores averaged from $140 thou-
sand t.o $325 thousand per
store. (p. 201)
The Justice Department procedures
can be used to help judge whether the
supermarket submarket--as I have defined







if one firm was
potential) opera-
tor of conventional supermarkets, super
stores, warehouse stores, etc. in Madi-
son, Wisconsin or Washington, D.C.,
could that firm profitably increase its
prices? For example, could that firm
raise prices by 2 or 3 percent and in-
crease profits? Or, would customers
transfer enough patronage to convenience
stores, small grocery stores and special-
ty markets that the supermarket firm’s
profits would decline? Assuming super-
market gross margins of 20 percent of
sales, a 2 percent price increase would
represent a 10 percent increase in gross
margins. Since there would be no appar-
ent change in costs, sales would have t.o
decline by roughly 10 percent. for no
change to occur in profits. Given the
much higher gross margin of convenience
stores and the one-stop shopping appeal
of supermarkets, I doubt that the super-
market chain in this example would lose
much sales as a result. of the price
increase.
The correct definition of relevant
product markets and submarkets is obvi-
ously critical in antitrust cases. It.
is also critical in attempting to study
structure-performance relations. For
example, entry into the convenience
store submarket is much easier than into
the supermarket submarket.. Compared to
supermarkets, desirable convenience
store sites are more numerous, initial
investment is much less, advertising is
relatively unimportant, and zone pricing
by incumbent retailers to deter entry is
highly unlikely. In short.,entry condi-
tions into the convenience store submar-
ket provide no indication of entry condi-




Barriers t.o entry are the
sine ~ non of monopoly and
‘for sellers have mgopoly,
little or no enduring power
over price when entry barriers
are nonexistent. (Scherer,
1971)
Journal of Food Distribution ResearchRecently, the theory of contestable
markets has placed great emphasis on
entry and exit conditions. If we could
only do a better job of measuring entry
barriers, I suspect we would see an out-
pouring of Ph.D. dissertations on this
aspect of market structure.
The height. of entry barriers are
measured in terms of the cost or selling
price advantages that established firms
have relative to the least disadvantaged
outside firms. The least disadvantaged
“potential entrants” into the supermarket
submarket of an SMSA are usually supermar-
ket chains that operate a warehouse with-
in about 200 miles and are a “competitive
factor” in a nearby city.
The ease of de novo entry into a
strategic group is likely to depend upon
the extent to which incumbent firms in
that group have fully exploited the mar-
ket potential. For older strategic
groups, such a conventional supermarkets,
they have probably gained about as much
of the market as they can in most. SMSAS.
There may lit.t.leeasily gained sales
for a new conventional supermarket.
By contrast, the warehouse and super-
warehouse store strategic groups are far
short of their market potential in many
SMSAS . Apparently a sizeable segment
of consumers in some markets prefer these
store formats. If allowed to enter,
warehouse stores will attract this seg-
ment of consumers. At some point, these
st.rat.egic groups will also achieve their
market potential--at which point, new
entry will be more difficult.
Significant new strategic groups
emerge only rarely in food retailing.
When they do--as in the case of warehouse
and super warehouse stores--de novo entry
into that strategic group may be easier
than it is into older strategic groups.
Where the new strategic group poses a
substantial threat to other strategic
groups, entry deterring action can be
expected. This is particularly likely
when the new strategic group is expected
to introduce non-trivial price competi-
tion.
Thus , warehouse stores and super
warehouse stores represent a sufficient-
ly better “mouse trap” that they have
entered some markets with relative
ease. For example, in qy home of Madi-
son, Wisconsin, a new Cub super ware-
house store reputedly garnered over 10
percent of grocery store sales in its
first six months of operation. As the
first warehouse store on the west side
of Madison, it filled a market vacuum--
an unmet. consumer demand. During the
last year, another super warehouse store
(Woodmans) has been built near Cub.
Whereas Cub found entry easy, Woodmans
has found it difficult since a signifi-
cant portion of its sales had to be
taken from Cub. With a new strategic
group, there are important first mover
advantages.
Let me turn my attention now to
entry conditions into the supermarket
submarket, I will comment particularly
on the barriers to de novo entry by
conventional supermarkets, superstores
and combination stores. The barriers
faced by these firms may be similar
to the barriers faced by warehouse
stores in a few years as they approach
their potential.
The Federal Trade Commission, in
reversing the Administrative Law Judge’s
(ALJ’s) opinion in the Grand Union case,
concluded that grocery retailing was
the relevant product market for that
case and that entry barriers into gro-
cery retailing are low. As the above
discussion indicates, I believe the
ALJ in that case was correct in defining
the supermarket submarket as the rele-
vant product market. Using this as
the relevant market, what evidence would
we expect to find if entry barriers
are low?
If entry barriers are low into the
supermarket submarket, there is no oppor-
tunity for sustained monopoly prices or
profits. We would expect to find no
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tion and prices. We would expect. to eee
few instances of predatory behavior; the
main incentive for predation is the expec-
tation of future supra competitive prices
and profits. These are only possible
where significant barriers exist. If
entry barriers are low, we would expect
to observe new entry into large SMSAS
a.s often (or more often) as into small
SMSAS . We also would expect to see all
sizes of firms entering various SMSAS;
with low barriers, there are many firms
that can successfully hurdle the barri-
ers. Finally, if entry barriers were
low, we would expect to see no medium
or large SMSAS with persistently high
levels of concentration and profits.
Economies of scale do not require high
levels of concentration except. in small
markets. With low entry barriers, new
entrants would be expected t.oerode high
concentration and profits in medium or
large markets.
As I examine the facts, they don’t
support the above scenario. First.--at
least. four different studies have found
a significant positive relationship be-
tween retail food prices and supermar-
ket (or grocery store) concentration
(Marion et al. 1979; Lamm 1981; Hall,
Schmitz and Cot.hern 1979; Cott.erill
1984). The relationship holds both in
studies that have examined SMSAS and
studies that have examined small cities.
The results are consistent with the grow-
ing number of studies of concentration-
price relationships in other industries.
The results of the price studies tell us
that entry barriers exist in at least
some markets.
To what extent do we see predatory
behavior in food retailing? Without
getting into the question of what consti-
tutes predation, I do want to comment
briefly on zone pricing. I believe there
is ample evidence that zone pricing is
widely used-- particularly by certain
chains-- to deter or limit the success of
a new entrant. The basic concept of zone
pricing means that it can only be em-
ployed by multi-store firms. When used
to deter entry, prices are normally
dropped in the 2 or 3 stores closest
to the new entrant while the remaining
stores of the chain maintain normal
prices. Because it can be employed
very selectively against a firm entering
with one, two or three stores, the incum-
bent chain can cross-subsidize the loss-
es or lower profits from its atores
near the new entrant by normal profits
from its remaining stores.
The long-run profit incentives for
a leading incumbent chain to employ
zone pricing to deter new entry are
substantial if the new entry is likely
to become a competitive “factor in the
market.” In addition, firms with large
market. shares have a much greater incen-
tive to deter new entry than firms with
a small market share. They also have a
greater capacity to use zone pricing
and cross-subsidization to deter entry.
The following example, based upon
the regression results of the Marion,
Mueller, et al., study, illustrates the
profit incentives for established firms
to block a new entrant. from becoming
est.abliahed. In the example the entrant
is assumed to achieve a moderate 8 per-
cent market share in a market in which
the top four firms have an initial 70
percent combined share. It is assumed
that the market share lost to a new
entrant is proportional to the market
share of established firms. The size
of market assumed for the example is
$1,000,000,000 of annual grocery store
sales which is about the size of Memphis
presently or Washington, D.C. in the
early 1970s.
Under these assumptions, a firm
with a 10 percent initial share stands
to lose $166,400 in profits per year if
the new entrant gains an 8 percent mar-
ket share. However, a firm with an
initial share of 30 percent would suffer
profit reductions nine times as great.
Although this illustration only holds
under rather narrow assumptions, it does
indicate the strong incentive which an
established firm may have to prevent.the
February 85/page 88 Journal of Food Distribution ResearchMarket Share of
Established Chain Firm’s Profit Rate
----------------- ------------------------- ----- Annual Profit
before after before after Reduction due
entry entry entry entry change to entry
10% 9.2% 1.45% 1.39% -.06 $166,000
30% 27.6% 2.94% 2,76% -.18 $1,312,000
successful entry of a new firm. The
stakes are particularly high for the
market leader.
Thus, without.dealing with the ques-
tion of when zone pricing constitutes
predation, I conclude that there are
strong incentives for the leading firms
in a market to deter new ent.rant.s through
zone pricing (and possibly other actions
such as increased advertising and promo-
tions). In addition, zone pricing ap-
pears t.obe frequently used as a response
to a new entrant.
An additional piece of evidence
concerning barriers is the extent to
which entry is observed in large and
small SMSAS, and by large, medium, or
small firms. Independent operators may
be satisfied to enter and operate one or
two stores in certain trading areas.
Their entry will affect competition in
those areas but. will affect. competition
market-wide only in small cities. When a
supermarket chain enters a metropolitan
area, however, they are usually intere-
sted in gradually penetrating all or
most of the market. If they are success-
ful in entering and building market
share, they influence competition first
in the trading areas directly affected
by their stores; at. some point as they
expand, their competitive influence is
sufficient to affect competition at the
market level. In the jargon of the
trade, they have become a competitive
“factor” in the market..
Thus , de novo entry by supermarket
chains is of particular interest.. In
addition, the ent.ry must be “effective”
in the sense of developing a sufficient
beachhead that it affects competition.
The Court held in Marine Bancorporation
(418 U.S. at 636-37) that for actual
potential entrant analysis, the only
entry that is significant is that which
has a “realistic hope of ultimately
producing reconcentration” or of having
a “meaningful effect on the economic
behavior” of the major market parti-
cipants.
In most markets, a market. share of
5 percent or more is needed to be a
competitive “factor,” although this may
not be true for particularly threatening
entrants such as a warehouse store. A
major chain that is entering the market
may also be a factor. Eugene Walters,
President of Commonwealth Foods, testi-
fied:
Anybody the size of Winn Dixie
that. wants to come into a
market, if you do not think
that they are a factor in the
market., you are making a cru-
cial mistake. They have the
assets and they have the re-
sources the same as any other
substantial company to come
in. You better consider them,
because they are not coming in
there for one store. (Federal
Trade Commission, 1981b, p.
36)
Time does not permit a comprehen-
sive analysis of “effective” entry activ-
ity. However, 1 have examined the 13
SMSAS included in the Grand Union case.
Only de novo entry by supermarket chains
between 1975 and 1983 was considered.
Table 1 summarizes my findings. Using a
5 percent market share as the threshold,
there were seven cases of effective
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Three firms accounted for the
8even instances: Foodtown (now Food
Lion), A1. bertson and Kroger. All three
rank among the 30 largest supermarket
chains. In these markets, large chains
were clearly best able to overcome the
barriers to de novo entry. Only Fayette-
ville, N.C. had two effective entrants.
Seven of the 13 SMSAR had no effective
entrants during this period although all
but one had ineffective entry. The entry
into the Atlanta SMSA is misleading since
it involved two BiLo stores on the fringe
of this 13-count.y SMSA. There has been
no effective entry into the Atlanta SMSA
since Winn Dixie in the late 1950s.
Given the relatively high concentration
of supermarket sales in this market
(SCR4=79 in 1977) and the frequent char-
acterization of Atlanta as a soft market
with high prices in the Grand Union case,
the lack of effective entry suggests that
some type of barrier exists. The Grand
Union proceedings provide abundant evi-
dence that entry barriers are particular-
ly high in a large SMSA such as Atlanta.
Finally, if entry barriers are low,
why has there been persistently high
levels of concentration in many markets?
Table 2 indicates the change in concen-
tration that occurred between 1972 and
1977. Although the very highly concen-
trated SMSAS experienced a slight decline
in supermarket four-firm concentration
(SCR4), the vast majority of the SMSAS
had an increase in SCR4.
Why is it that markets such as Wash-
ington, D.C. and Denver have had very
high levels of concentration for years?
Why is it that Kroger had dominated the
Cincinnati market for at least the last
twenty years? Surely, if entry were
easy, there must be other firms whose
stores would catch the fancy of Cincin-
nati, Washington and Denver consumers.
So much for what I consider the
“circumstantial” evidence that entry
barriers are significant. into the super-
market submarket. Let me now comment
on five of the most important barriers
to effective entry, These are:
1. Economies of store size
2. Multi-store economies, including
advertising
3. Capital costs and risk
4. Store sites
5. Entry forestalling practices by
incumbent supermarket chains
Economies of store size. Because
of the sharp increase in the number of
items carried and consumer preference
for store features such as service deli-
catessens and wide aisles, the minimum
desired size of supermarkets has steadi-
ly increased. Larger stores require
large capital expenditures and substan-
tial sales to break even.
Supermarkets averaged $6 million
in annual sales in 1981 (Progressive
Grocer, 1982). A city of 25-
could support four supermarkets of this
size; a small SMSA of 50,000 people
could support about eight. Thus, in
small cities and SMSAS, a new entrant,
faces the challenge of taking substan-
tial sales from existing firms (a “dis-
placement” effect). In general, the
larger the displacement effect of a
new entrant, the stronger the resistance
from incumbent firms. Because the aver-
age cost curve of supermarkets is sharp-
ly downward sloping at low volumes, new
entrants are usually at a substantial
cost disadvantage unless they are able
to achieve the desired store volume.
For the new entrant, sales volume is
the key to survival.
Super warehouse stores, such as Cub
and Edwards, are often very large
(40,000 to 80,000 square feet). when
these stores enter a market , the dis-
placement effect. is many times that
of a conventional supermarket entrant.
Whereas the latter may take $6 million
per year in sales from incumbent firms,
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Provided by special tabulation of Bureau of Census and included in Marion
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From Complaint Counsel’s Answering Brief, In the Matter of Grand Union et
al, Atlanta Regional Office, Federal Trade Commission, March 12, 1982,
p. 24-25, plus trade magazines, newspapers and directories.
Metro Market Studies, “1984 Grocery Distribution,Analysis and Guide,”
Weston, MA, 1984.
Journal of Food Distribution Research February 85/page 91Table 2. Comparison of Four-firm Grocery Store and Supermarket
Concentration Figures, 240 SMSAS, 1972 and 1977
Grocery Store Grocery Store Cone. Supermarket Cone.
Concentration Nr, of Mean CR4 Mean CR4 Mean CR4 Mean CR4
in 1972 (CR4) SMSAS in 1972 in 1977 in 1972 in 1977
< 30 5 27.86 32.20 38.40 41.42
30 < 40 17 35.07 40,02 48.65 51.51
40 < 50 81 44.90 49.71 61,84 64.87
50 < 60 77 54.69 58.05 72.12 73.30
6(3< 7(3 45 65.72 66.02 83.44 82.52
k 70 15 74.93 76.89 90.40 88.49
Total 240 52.58 56.09 69.55 70.93
Source: Marion, Parker and Handy.
some super warehouse stores do $25 to
$50 million in sales per year.
The displacement effect of a new
warehouse store in a relatively small
SMSA is documented in the Shoppin’ Bag
v. Dillon Case (U.S. District Court for
Colorado, No. 81-Z-1548 [1979]). In
March 1979, Shoppin’ Bag opened a ware-
house store in Pueblo, Colorado. As
the first warehouse store in Pueblo, it
had little difficulty attracting sales
with its substantially lower prices.
With annual sales of approximately $30
million, King Soopers was the market
leader in the Pueblo SMSA with a 30 per-
cent market share. Safeway was number
two with 27 percent of the market. Assum-
ing no price response by incumbent firms,
King Soopers estimated the Shoppin’ Bag
store would take 14 percent of their
sales, 11 percent of Safeway’s sales
and 26 percent of Albert.son’s sales.
This proved to be a greater sales loss
than King Soopers was willing to take.
Nine weeks after the Shoppin’ Bag store
opened, King Soopers lowered prices on
thousands of grocery items to meet or
beat Shoppin’ Bag prices. Shoppin’ Bag
sales dropped by about.one-half, resulti-
ng in substantial losses. It. was on
the verge of closing the store when
an FTC investigation led King Soopers
to raise its prices.
Mult.i-st.ore economies, including
advertising. Industry witnesses in the
Grand Union case testified that multiple
store entry was necessary for a supermar-
ket chain that intended to become a
competitive “factor” in an SMSA. The
size of the SMSA is positively related
to the number of stores necessary for
effective entry. William Stewart, a
former president of Colonial and former
vice president of Grand Union, estimated
the number of conventional supermarkets
necessary for profitable entry ranged
from a low of two in Fayetteville, North
Carolina, to a high of twelve in Atlan-
ta, Georgia (Federal Trade Commission,
1981b).
Multi-store economies accrue from
the costs and effects of advertising
in medium and large SMSAS. In addition,
the reactions of incumbents, such as
zone pricing, is better borne by stores
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cases where a new entrant provides a
combination of products, prices and ser-
vices that fill an unmet need in the
market., it may have little difficulty
attracting customers from established
stores. In the normal situation, how-
ever, advertising is a major vehicle
to attract the sales necessary for an
entrant to operate its stores at low
unit costs. However, area wide newspaper
advertising (or television) is very expen-
sive, particularly in large metropolitan
areas. New entrants can expect t.ospend
as much as 5 percent of sales on advertisi-
ng for their first year(s) in such a
market, placing them at a substantial
cost disadvantage relative to established
firms, which are more likely to spend
about one percent of sales on advertis-
ing. New entrants must rapidly increase b
store numbers and total sales if they
are to eliminate this cost disadvantage.
But, to do so requires taking sales from
incumbent firms. Thus, economies of
scale in advertising requires new en-
trants to have a significant displacement.
effect, particularly in large SMSAS.
In addition, the leading firms in a
market can more fully take advantage of
advertising allowances offered by manu-
facturers than fringe firms or new en-
trants. This accentuates the advertising
cost disadvantage faced by entering
firms. Alternative advertising media,
such as hand bills and direct mail, can
be used but are often considered t.ohave
less consumer impact per dollar of cost.
The advertising costs and difficulty
of quickly building a sufficient sales
base over which to spread these costs
can be a major reason why regional chains
will not. attempt to enter a large SMSA.
This was the main reason given by the
General Manager of Ingles Markets for
not attempting to enter Atlanta (Federal
Trade Commission, 1981b, p. 40). Grand
Union executives indicated that advertis-
ing per dollar of sales in their expan-
sion areas (Baltimore and west coast of
Florida) were two and one-half times
that in areas where Grand Union was estab-
lished (Federal Trade Commission, 1981b,
p. 41).
Capital costs and risk. In order
to open a new 25,000 to 30,000 square
foot- supermarke-t in 1980, bet-ween
$500,000 and $1 million was required
to equip and stock the store (Federal
Trade Commission, 1981c, p. 216). In
addition, supermarket firms must obli-
gate themselves for leases on new
stores; this liability is approximately
$3.0 to $3.5 million per store. Thus,
a total of roughly four million dollars
per new store is at risk.
Drawing on the estimates of indus-
try members in the Grand Union case,
I will assume nine stores are necessary
for effective de novo entry into the
Atlanta SMSA core; nine times $4 million
is $36 million at risk. These are not
all sunk costs. If attempted entry is
unsuccessful, these commitments have
some salvage value. These figures do
not include advertising and promotional
expenditures incurred during entry,
which are sunken costs.
The magnitude of capital costs and
investment risk are generally a direct
function of the SMSA size. Whereas
Atlanta may require an at risk commit-
ment of $36 million +, Fayetteville or
Gainesville may requi~e only $4 to $8
million for effective entry.
Store sites. A major element, in
attracting sales to a store is a good
location. Store sites for supermarkets
are mostly made available through devel-
opers. The best sites are usually in or
adjacent. to shopping centers where cus-
tomer traffic is concentrated. It is
a typical practice for developers to
sign a supermarket tenant. before they
attempt to recruit other tenants and
often before obtaining financing. The
supermarket may be used as a selling
point. The leading chain in the market
is the most proven traffic builder in
that area. New entrants are often uncer-
tain traffic builders and represent
substantial risk. If a new ent.rant
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center closed for a time, the entire
shopping center will be hurt. Because
of this risk, a new entrant able to get
a site in a shopping center is likely
to pay higher rental costs than the lead-
ing chains in the market. Where the new
entrant has something unique to offer
that has proven highly successful in
other markets, the above may not be true
(e.g., a warehouse store in a market
without. any). However, this is relative-
ly rare.
Entry -forestalling practices of
established chains. Established firms
lose sales and Profits if a new firm en-
ters the market and becomes established.
The seriousness of the perceived threat
will largely determine how established
firms respond. If the new entrant fills
a relatively small niche in the market
and is not perceived as a major threat
to conventional supermarkets, the re-
sponse may be relatively mild. However,
if established firms perceive the new
entrant. as a strong threat to their
sales, they may attempt to forestall its
successful entry or cause it. to incur
large costs, thereby impeding subsequent
expansion. Anew entrant is particularly
vulnerable to an aggressive competitive
response during its entry phase because
its stores are on the sharply declining
section of their average cost curves. If
the established firms can successfully
limit an entrant’s sales growth in the
initial phase, they can impose heavy
losses on the entrant.
The costs and benefits to the estab-
lished firms of undertaking aggressive
action are generally related to its mar-
ket position and the extent to which
the entrant is expected to affects its
sales. There are two entry forestalling
practices that deserve comment. One is
zone pricing, increased advertising and
other t.act.ical responses immediately
prior to or after a new entrant. opens
its stores. The second is to prevent
access to preferred new sites by build-
ing stores ahead of sales. The latter
is a general preemptive strategy that
is aimed at all new entrants. The for-
mer only takes place when a new entrant
hae one or more sites and has taken
definite action to enter the market.
The action taken by incumbents
depends upon the strategic group of
which the entrant. is expected to be a
part . In some cases, incumbents may
decide store remodellings are a better
response than reducing prices. However,
increased advertising and promotions and
reduced prices are frequent tactics used
to counter a new ent.ranto This is parti-
cularly likely in SMSAS with one or more
dominant. chains. These chains have a
strong incentive to deter entry, and can
employ zone pricing in stores near the
new entrant to force the new entrant. to
carry low prices and sustain large loss-
es while it tries to attract. sales.
Multi-store entry by large chains are
less likely to be subjected to zone
pricing by incumbents because the new
entrants have the financial resources to
withstand such actions; in addition,
incumbents would have to drop prices
more broadly in the market and possibly
trigger a price war.
Occasionally, a price war results
from new entry. Bill Saporito describes
Kroger’s entry into the San Antonio
market :
Like a thunderstorm off the
Gulf of Mexico, it rolled in
with 14 stores and a warehouse
in two years. It was betting
an estimated $100 million that
it could take a big bite of
the market . . . . Lo and
behold, H. E. Butt Grocery Co.
the then and present market
leader, knew how to play de-
fense Kroger-st.yle. . . . [It.]
matched Kroger new store for
new store, price for price,
precipitating a price war the
like of which the city had
never seen. Two smaller
chains went to the bottom.
(Saporito, p. 80)
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only held 11 percent of this market com-
pared to H. E. Butt’s market share of
26 percent (Metro Market Studies, 1984).
Entry forestalling tactics of this
type raise the cost of entry and when
used against a less formidable entrant
than Kroger, may very well prevent suc-
cessful entry (see earlier discussion
of Shoppin’ Bag’s entry into Pueblo).
These tactics can also serve an important
strategic role in signaling other poten-
tial entrants that the incumbent firm
greets new entrants like a grizzly bear.
Thus , zone pricing, massive advertising
campaigns and other aggressive responses
to new entrants may not only be aimed
at the entrant in question but. intended
as warning to future potential entrants
(Spence 1981).
Another tactic to forestall entry
in the supermarket industry is geographic
preemption (Mallen and Haberman). Simply
put, this is building stores ahead of
sales. Since the growing parts of metrop-
olitan areas are most susceptible to
entry, it may be profitable in the long
run for a leading firm to build stores
in prime locations in anticipation of
future population growth. Although sub-
stantial losses may be incurred for a
year or so, this practice makes new entry
more difficult and enables a leading
firm t.oprotect its market position.
Large chains can overcome all of
these five barriers more easily than
small . For example, “Grand Union manage-
ment., in outlining a Florida West. Coast
Development Program for 1976-1980, anti-
cipated operating their eighteen stores
on the West Coast of Florida at a sub-
stantial loss for at least five years”
(Federal Trade Commission, 1981c, p.
216). Large chains can cross subsidize
from other markets and have greater total
resources on which t.o rely during an
entry attempt.
Because de novo entry can be slow,
costly and uncertain, entry via acquisi-
tion is often preferred by chains when
antitrust laws and enforcement permit.
The surest route around other
San Antonios led to the acquis-
ition of Dillon, the llt.h
largest U.S. chain, which has
a lock on established markets,
much like Kroger’s own. At
some $600 million in Kroger
stock, Dillon was the priciest.
supermarket acquisition in
history. But Everingham fig-
ures it was a bargain. To
crack Denver from scratch, as
it did in San Antonio, Kroger
would have had to lay out $500
million, facing price wars and
no guarantee of market share.
(Saporito, p. 80)
Entry barriers are clearly higher
in large SMSAS. All else the same,
entry barriers are also higher in SMSAS
in which: a) a high percentage of gro-
cery store sales are held by supermar-
kets indicating that there is little
unmet demand for supermarkets; b) super-
market sales are highly concentrated;
c) there is one or more dominant super-
market chain in the market.; d) there
is little or no growth in SMSA grocery
store sales.
Taken in total, I believe there is
relatively strong evidence that the
barriers to effective entry into the
supermarket submarket are substantial.
This is particularly true in large
SMSAS . Entry forestalling behavior
makes little sense if there are low
barriers; a firm would be unable to
gain the benefits of entry deterrence
without. attracting new entry. The posi-
tive relationship between price and
seller concentration found in several
empirical studies is also difficult
to explain if there are low barriers.
Entry conditions vary for different
strategic groups and different markets.
As a new “mousetrap,” warehouse and
super warehouse stores have enjoyed a
welcome response by consumers in several
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increases, entry by new warehouse stores
will become more difficult. For example,
a new warehouse store entrant into Minnea-
polis or Milwaukee will find it tougher
to attract sales than the first entrants.
With nearly half of the sales in these
markets, warehouse type stores may be
approaching their market potential.
For at least some consumers, low prices
are not the primary criterion for select-
ing a store. For example, Byerly’s and
Lund ‘s, operators of large, luxurious
superstores in Minneapolis report. that
their business has been unaffected by
the growth of super warehouse stores
in that market (Supermarket News, p. 32).
Conclusions
So--what. does all this add up to?
If there are significant entry barriera,
as I believe there are--particularly in
large SMSAs-- then mergers can have an
important effect on competition in food
retailing. Significant. horizontal merg-
ers-- especially involving the top two
or three firms-- are obviously of con-
cern. However, the FTC has to be con-
vinced that entry barriers are signifi-
cant in the supermarket industry before
it is likely to take much action.
In addition, I believe we need to
rethink the pros and cons of large market
extension mergers. As our present anti-
trust laws are written, such mergers are
illegal only when the effects “may be
aubstant.ially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.” There is
no requirement that such mergers carry
some social benefits. I see little re-
deeming social value from the Grand Union-
Colonial, Kroger-Dillon or American
Stores-Jewel mergers. These mergers
were not made to salvage a company in
trouble. They are unlikely to improve
efficiency. If anything, inefficiency
and unnecessary costs are likely to in-
crease in larger organizations. Capital
that. could have been used to build new
stores, install new equipment, and enter
new markets-- thereby enhancing efficiency
and competition--has been used instead
to buy other companies.
As sizeable companies are swallowed
up through mergers, the number of firms
is reduced that have the resources to
enter large markets with high entry
barriers. Small and medium companies,
which from my experience are often the
best run and most aggressive competi-
tors, also are limited through a lax
merger policy, Applebaums, Altermans,
Star Marketa in Rochester, and Purity
Supreme are a few examples.
Since the total financial strength
of a chain definitely affects its abil-
ity to overcome entry barriers, competi-
tion would probably be better served if
mergers were channeled to small and
medium size companies. This was done
during 1965-74. Large chains were
forced to enter new markets whether de
novo or through toehold acquisitions,
both of which tend t.o be pro competi-
tive.
While I see no evidence that fur-
ther consolidation among the largest
supermarket chains will carry benefits
either to the public or to the U.S. food
marketing system, large mergers are
unlikely to be challenged without a
change in the law. This is unlikely at
present.. Thus , until the pendulum
swings back to a stronger role for anti-
trust., perhaps the best that. can be
done is to develop more evidence on
the factors affecting the competitive
performance of grocery retailing.
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